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9.1 Introduction
China has in many ways taken the world by storm. In addition to its
swiftly rising prominence in the global trading system, where it now ac-
counts for over 6 percent of total world trade, it has also become a magnet
for foreign direct investment (FDI), overtaking the United States (in 2003)
as the number one destination for FDI.
It was not always thus. China’s integration with the global economy be-
gan in earnest only after the market-oriented reforms that were instituted
in 1978. Capital inﬂows, in particular, were minimal in the 1970s and 1980s,
impeded by capital controls and the reluctance of international investors
to undertake investment in a socialist economy with weak institutions and
limited exposure to international trade. All of this changed in the early
1990s, when FDI inﬂows surged dramatically because of the selective
opening of China’s capital account as well as the rapid trade expansion
that, in conjunction with China’s large labor pool, created opportunities
for foreign investors. These inﬂows have remained strong ever since, even
during the Asian crisis of the late 1990s.
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ture and determinants of China’s capital inﬂows is of considerable interest
for analytical reasons as well as for understanding the implications for the
regional and global allocation of capital. Our primary objective in this pa-
per is to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of the main aspects of cap-
ital inﬂows into China. Given the degree of interest in China and the rela-
tive paucity of data, we aim to provide a benchmark reference tool for
other researchers, in part by providing some critical perspectives on the
numbers that we report.
Section 9.2 presents a detailed picture of the evolution of China’s capi-
tal inﬂows. A feature of particular interest is that China’s capital inﬂows
have generally been dominated by FDI, which, for an emerging market,
constitutes a preferred form of inﬂows, since FDI tends to be stable and as-
sociated with other beneﬁts such as transfers of technological and mana-
gerial expertise. An interesting aspect of these inﬂows is that, contrary to
some popular perceptions, they come mainly from other advanced Asian
countries that have net trade surpluses with China, rather than from the
United States and Europe, which constitute China’s main export markets.
As for other types of inﬂows, China has limited its external debt to low lev-
els, and non-FDI private capital inﬂows have typically been quite limited,
until recently.
In section 9.3, we examine the evolution of the balance of payments and
dissect the recent surge in the pace of accumulation of international re-
serves. A key ﬁnding is that, although current account surpluses and FDI
have remained important contributors to reserve accumulation, the dra-
matic surge in the pace of reserve accumulation since 2001 is largely at-
tributable to non-FDI capital inﬂows. We provide some analytical per-
spectives on the costs and beneﬁts of holding a stock of reserves that now
amounts to nearly 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). There has
also been considerable international attention focused recently on the issue
of the currency composition of China’s massive stock of international re-
serves (which is now second only to that of Japan). Despite data con-
straints, we attempt to shed what little light we can on this issue, both by
carefully examining a popular source of data for China’s holding of U.S.
securities and by calculating the potential balance-of-payments implica-
tions of reserve valuation eﬀects associated with the depreciation of the
U.S. dollar in recent years.
Section 9.4 discusses the broader composition of China’s capital inﬂows
in the context of the burgeoning literature on ﬁnancial globalization.
Notwithstanding the recent surge of non-FDI inﬂows, FDI remains his-
torically the dominant source of inﬂows into China. The literature on the
beneﬁts and risks of ﬁnancial globalization suggests that China may have
beneﬁted greatly in terms of improving the risk-return trade-oﬀs by having
its inﬂows tilted so much toward FDI.
Whether this composition of inﬂows is a result of enlightened policies,
422 Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin Weithe structure of institutions, or plain luck is an intriguing question. In
section 9.5, we examine various hypotheses that have been put forward to
explain why China has its inﬂows so heavily tilted toward FDI. In this
context, we provide a detailed description of China’s capital account
restrictions and how these have evolved over time. While controls on non-
FDI inﬂows as well as tax and other incentives appear to be proximate
factors for explaining the FDI-heavy composition of inﬂows, other fac-
torsmay also have contributed to this outcome. It is not straightforward to
disentangle the quantitative relevance of alternative hypotheses. We ar-
gue, nonetheless, that at least a few of the hypotheses—including some
mercantilist-type arguments that have been advanced recently—are not
consistent with the facts.
9.2 The Chinese Pattern of Inﬂows and Some International Comparisons
9.2.1 The Evolution of Capital Inﬂows
Gross capital inﬂows into China were minuscule before the early 1980s.
After 1984, the “other investment” category, which includes bank lending,
increased signiﬁcantly and accounted for the largest share of total inﬂows
during the 1980s (ﬁgure 9.1). FDI rose gradually from the early 1980s to
early 1991 and then rose dramatically through the mid-1990s. During the
1990s, FDI accounted for the lion’s share of inﬂows. It is interesting to note
that FDI inﬂows were only marginally aﬀected during the Asian crisis. Fig-
ure 9.2 provides some more detail on the evolutions of the main compo-
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Fig. 9.1 Level and composition of gross capital inﬂows, 1982–2003 (in billions of
U.S. dollars)Fig. 9.2 Gross capital ﬂows by component (in billions of U.S. dollars): A, direct in-
vestment; B, portfolio investment; C, bank lending; D, other investment (excluding
bank lending)
Source: CEIC database.
Note: Scales diﬀer across the four panels of this ﬁgure.
A B
C Dnents of the capital account, in terms of both gross outﬂows and inﬂows.
Note that all components other than FDI show sharp increases in outﬂows
in the period immediately after the Asian crisis, with the subsequent re-
covery in net inﬂows of these components taking two to three years to ma-
terialize. Recent data indicate that, after remaining in a range of around
$50 billion during 2002–3, gross FDI inﬂows increased to almost $61 bil-
lion in 2004.
From a cross-country perspective, China’s net capital inﬂows are of
course large in absolute magnitude but hardly remarkable relative to the
size of the economy. Before the Asian crisis, many of the other “Asian
tigers” had signiﬁcantly larger inﬂows relative to their GDP (ﬁgure 9.3,
panel A). What is striking, however, is that, except for Singapore, the share
of FDI in total inﬂows is clearly the highest for China. Its total net inﬂows
as a share of GDP rank among the highest across all emerging markets af-
ter the Asian crisis, especially since many of the Asian tigers were no longer
the darlings of international investors (ﬁgure 9.3, panel B). While the net
inﬂows dropped sharply across all emerging markets after the late 1990s,
the interesting thing to note is that most of the inﬂows that did come into
the emerging markets after 1999 took the form of FDI.
China’s average net inﬂows, and the share of FDI in those inﬂows, look
quite similar during the periods 1990–96 and 1999–2003. Since FDI is
clearly the main story in the context of China’s capital inﬂows, we now turn
to a more detailed examination of these ﬂows.
9.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment
Over the past decade, China has accounted for about one-third of gross
FDI ﬂows to all emerging markets and about 60 percent of these ﬂows to
Asian emerging markets (ﬁgure 9.4, panel A). Even excluding ﬂows from
Hong Kong to China from these calculations (on the extreme assumption
that all of these ﬂows represent “round-tripping” of funds originating in
China—this point is discussed further below), China’s share in these ﬂows
to emerging markets is substantial (ﬁgure 9.4, panel B). The shares spike
upward during the Asian crisis and, more recently, in 2002, when weak-
nesses in the global economy resulted in a slowdown in ﬂows from indus-
trial countries to most emerging markets other than China. With the
pickup in ﬂows to emerging markets in 2003, there was a corresponding de-
cline in China’s share, even though ﬂows to China remained essentially un-
changed.
Where are China’s FDI inﬂows coming from? Table 9.1 shows the share
of utilized FDI by source country. Some aspects of the results are worth
noting. First of all, the share of Hong Kong has declined steadily over the
past decade, from 58 percent in 1994 to 32 percent in 2004. One of the con-
cerns in interpreting FDI data for China is that a signiﬁcant portion of
these ﬂows could potentially represent round-tripping to take advantage of
The Chinese Approach to Capital Inﬂows 425Fig. 9.3 Asian economies and emerging markets: Net capital ﬂows (in percent of
GDP): A, before Asian crisis (average 1990–96); B, after Asian crisis (average
1999–2003)
Source: World Economic Outlook database.
aAverage for emerging markets in EMBI  index, excluding Latin America and Asian coun-
tries.
A
BFig. 9.4 China’s share of foreign direct investment inﬂows to emerging markets: 
A, FDI to China; B, FDI to China minus FDI from Hong Kong
Sources: World Economic Outlook database, CEIC database, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: This ﬁgure uses data on gross FDI ﬂows in percent of FDI to emerging Asia and all
emerging markets. Panel B excludes gross FDI ﬂows to China originating from Hong Kong





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.preferential tax treatment of foreign investment relative to domestic in-
vestment. Much of this round-tripping is believed to take place through
Hong Kong. While it is diﬃcult to estimate the extent of round-tripping,
the declining share of Hong Kong in total inﬂows at least suggests that the
magnitude of round-tripping as a share of total FDI inﬂows may have been
declining over time. On the other hand, the shares of small economies like
the Virgin Islands and Western Samoa, which have risen over the past few
years, could now be accounting for some of these round-tripping ﬂows.1
Asian economies account for a substantial fraction of China’s FDI in-
ﬂows. For instance, over the period 2001–4, ﬁve Asian economies—Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—together account for about
60 percent of FDI inﬂows. That a lot of China’s FDI comes from these rel-
atively advanced Asian economies suggests that these ﬂows do bring the
usual beneﬁts associated with FDI, including transfers of technological and
managerial expertise. The other interesting point to note is that—contrary
to the widespread perception of large direct investment ﬂows from western
industrial economies to China—the United States and the European
Union (EU) economies together accounted for only 15 percent of total in-
ﬂows in 2003, and even that is down from a share of 22 percent in 1999–
2000. Even if one were to assume that half of the reported FDI inﬂows from
Hong Kong are accounted for by round-tripping and that all of the share of
the Virgin Islands in fact represents ﬂows originating in the United States,
the share of the United States and the EU in China’s total FDI inﬂows
would be about 30 percent, a large but hardly dominant share. Preliminary
data for 2004 indicate that the share of Hong Kong has declined by about
1.5 percentage points and that of the United States is down by 1 percentage
point, while Korea’s share has increased by over 2 percentage points.
To which parts and regions of China’s economy are FDI inﬂows being
directed? Table 9.2 shows that about two-thirds of these ﬂows have been
going into manufacturing, with real estate accounting for about another 10
percent. Within manufacturing, the largest identiﬁable share has consis-
tently gone to electronics and communication equipment. The share of
manufacturing has risen by almost 15 percentage points since 1998, largely
at the expense of the shares of utilities, construction, transport and tele-
communication services, and real estate. Since the industries with declin-
ing FDI shares are largely focused on nontraded goods, the evolution of
this pattern of FDI seems to be consistent with the notion that these in-
ﬂows have been stimulated by China’s increasing access (both actual and
anticipated) to world export markets following its accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
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1. A more likely possibility is that those could be ﬂows from sources such as Japan, Taiwan,
and the United States that are channeled through such oﬀshore ﬁnancial centers in order to
evade taxes in the source countries.The regional distribution within China of utilized FDI inﬂows has
shown some changes over time (table 9.3). Guangdong Province has typi-
cally accounted for about one-quarter of FDI inﬂows, consistent with its
proximity to Hong Kong and its reputation as an exporting powerhouse,
but its share fell by about 7 percentage points from 1995–97 to 2003. The
big winner over the past few years has been Jiangsu Province (next to
Shanghai), which increased its share from 12 percent in 1995–97 to 25 per-
cent in 2003, thereby displacing Guangdong from the lead position.2 This
has come at the expense of the relative shares of provinces such as Fujian,
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Table 9.2 Utilized FDI by sector (percent share)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2004 
(September)
Primary sector 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8
Extraction industries 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.6
Manufacturing 56.3 56.1 63.5 65.9 69.8 69.0 70.9
Textiles 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.1 5.6 4.1 3.6
Chemicals and raw materials 4.3 4.8 4.4 4.7 6.0 4.9 4.4
Medicine 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.2
Ordinary machinery 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.2 2.9 3.4
Special use equipment 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.5 2.3 3.5
Electronics and communication 
equipment 5.3 7.8 11.3 15.1 20.0 11.9 13.0
Utilities 6.8 9.2 5.5 4.8 2.6 2.4 2.0
Construction 4.5 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.3
Transport and telecommunication 
services 3.6 3.8 2.5 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.2
Distribution industries 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.1 1.3
Banking and ﬁnance 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4
Real estate 14.1 13.9 11.4 11.0 10.7 9.8 9.4
Development and operations 12.0 11.7 10.7 10.2 9.9 9.5 8.9
Social services 6.5 6.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.9 5.9
Hotels 1.1 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.6
Healthcare, sports, and 
social welfare 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Media and broadcasting 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.8
Scientiﬁc research services 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
Other 2.4 1.9 3.6 2.3 2.5 4.2 1.7
Source: CEIC database.
2. In the early 1980s, Guangdong was heavily promoted as a leading experimental lab for
market-oriented reforms, due in part to its proximity to Hong Kong. By contrast, the reform
of the Yangtze River Delta region (especially Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang) was held back
in the 1980s. Shanghai was a key provider of revenue to the central government and, since the
experiment with a market economy was considered risky, central planning features were
largely retained there until the late 1980s. Once it was clear that the market economy experi-
ment was working well, reforms in Shanghai went into full swing.Tianjin, Hebei, and Hainan. Except for Fujian, however, the other
provinces didn’t have large shares to begin with.
Another phenomenon of some interest is the increase in FDI outﬂows
from China. As China intensiﬁes its trade linkages with other Asian econ-
omies, anecdotal evidence suggests that its FDI outﬂows have increased sig-
niﬁcantly in recent years. This phenomenon has been actively encouraged
by the Chinese government as part of its policy of gradual capital account
liberalization. Since 2001, some steps have been taken each year to ease re-
strictions on FDI outﬂows (see appendix B). However, while it is true that
FDI outﬂows have risen almost tenfold from the mid-1990s to 2003, the to-
tal outﬂows are still small, amounting to only about $3 billion in 2003 (table
9.4). Much of these outﬂows has indeed gone to other Asian economies, es-
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Table 9.3 Foreign direct investment inﬂows into China by region (in percent of total
FDI inﬂows)
Average 1995–2003 Average 1995–1997 Average 2000–2003 2003
Guandong 25.1 27.0 22.3 14.6
Jiangsu 15.3 12.8 17.4 19.7
Shanghai 8.5 8.8 8.8 10.2
Fujian 8.7 9.9 7.2 4.9
Shandong 7.1 6.2 8.8 11.2
Beijing 3.9 3.4 3.8 4.1
Zhejiang 4.5 3.4 6.0 9.3
Tianjin 4.1 4.8 3.3 2.9
Liaoning 4.7 4.3 5.5 5.3
Hebei 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.8
Guangxi 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.8
Hubei 2.2 1.7 2.6 2.9
Hainan 1.4 2.1 1.0 0.8
Hunan 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
Jiangxi 1.2 0.8 1.6 3.0
Henan 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0
Anhui 0.8 1.2 0.7 0.7
Sichuan 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8
Heilongjiang 1.0 1.4 0.7 0.6
Jilin 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.4
Shaanxi 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.6
Chongqing 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.5
Shanxi 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
Inner Mongolia 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.2
Yunnan 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Quizhou 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.pecially Hong Kong. The United States has, over the past decade, ac-
counted for about 8 percent of China’s FDI outﬂows. More recently, the
Chinese government has encouraged FDI outﬂows to countries in Asia and
Latin America in order to ensure more reliable sources of raw materials (for
instance, by purchasing mining operations) and upstream products for pro-
cessing in China. Preliminary data for 2004 indicate that China’s FDI out-
ﬂows amounted to about $3.6 billion in 2004, with about half of this invest-
ment going to Latin America and 40 percent to other Asian countries.3
9.2.3 External Debt
Unlike some other emerging markets, China has been quite cautious
about taking on external debt (ﬁgure 9.5). There has been little sovereign
borrowing until very recently, and, as a matter of policy, enterprises have
been discouraged from taking on external debt. As a consequence,
notwithstanding the signiﬁcant increase in the absolute amount of exter-
nal debt since the mid-1980s, the ratio of external debt to GDP has re-
mained relatively stable at around 15 percent since the early 1990s.
However, it is not just the level of external debt but also the maturity
structure of this debt that has been shown to be associated with currency
and ﬁnancial crises. As discussed earlier, countries that have more short-
term debt relative to long-term debt tend to be more susceptible to such
crises. On this score, one noteworthy development is that the share of
short-term debt in China’s total external debt has risen signiﬁcantly, from
9 percent in 2000 to over 45 percent in 2004 (ﬁgure 9.6and table 9.5).4 This
level is close to the threshold that some studies have identiﬁed as posing a
high risk of crises. However, this increase could appear more dramatic than
warranted, since this ratio appears to have bottomed in 2000. Further-
more, a signiﬁcant part of the increase in the relative importance of short-
term debt since 2001 can be accounted for by the surge in trade credits.
Trade credits constituted 19 percent of total external debt in 2003, up from
13 percent in 2001 (table 9.5). The increase in trade credits accounts for
about two-ﬁfths of the total increase in outstanding external credit from
2001 to 2004.5 While trade credits often have short maturities, they do not
pose the same type of risks as other short-term borrowing since they tend
to be closely linked to subsequent export receipts.
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3. Oﬃcial reports note that the cumulative amount of outward FDI as of the end of 2004
was $37 billion, which does not seem to match the annual data shown in this table. Based on
anecdotal and other evidence, however, the upward trend in FDI outﬂows is incontrovertible
even if the magnitudes may be suspect.
4. The ratio of short-term external debt to GDP has risen from 1.2 percent to 5.5 percent
over this period.
5. One cautionary note about the trade credit data in the external debt statistics is that they
are estimated partly from data on imports. Consequently, they do not always match the bal-
ance-of-payments data on trade credits (discussed below), which are based on sample surveys.
But the broad trends revealed by these two sources are similar.Fig. 9.5 External debt: Cross-country comparison (in percent of GDP): A, aver-
age 1990–98; B, average 1999–2003
Sources: World Economic Outlook database, CEIC database, and joint BIS-OECD-IMF-
WB statistics on external debt. Includes private-sector debt.
aAverage for Hong Kong consists of data between 1996 and 1998.
bAverage for Korea consists of data between 1994 and 1998.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 In short, while the stock of debt is in itself not a source of concern, the
maturity structure and composition of this debt bear careful observation.6
9.3 International Reserves
9.3.1 Recent Developments
A diﬀerent perspective on China’s capital inﬂows is provided by exam-
ining the evolution of the balance of payments and the stock of interna-
tional reserves.7 Table 9.6 shows that China’s gross international reserves
have risen sharply over the past decade, from well below $50 billion during
1990–93 to $457 billion at the end of 2003, with almost a third of this
buildup occurring in 2003.8 This has left China with the second largest
stock of international reserves in the world, behind Japan alone, amount-
ing to about 32 percent of its nominal GDP at the end of 2003.
In 2004, gross reserves rose at an even faster pace than in previous years,
reaching $619 billion at the end of the year, according to oﬃcial ﬁgures.
However, it is necessary to add the $45 billion used for bank recapitaliza-
tion at the end of 2003 to this stock in order to allow for comparability of
the stock levels in 2003 and 2004 (these adjusted ﬁgures are reported in
table 9.6). Thus, we arrive at an increase of $206 billion, or an average of
about $17.2 billion a month, during 2004 (compared to $162 billion, or
about $13.5 billion a month, during 2003). Since balance-of-payments
data for 2004 were not available at the time of this writing, the remainder
of this section focuses on data through 2003.
Of the total increase of about $430 billion in reserves over the past
decade, cumulative ﬂows on the current account balance amount to about
$216 billion, while ﬂows on the capital account sum up to $300 billion. The
residual is given by cumulative errors and omissions, which amount to
about –$85 billion over this period.
It is instructive to examine the factors underlying changes in the pace of
reserve accumulation over time. After registering relatively small changes
over the period 1985–93, reserve accumulation rose sharply and averaged
$30 billion a year over the period 1994–97. This was largely due to a strong
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6. The World Bank’s 2003 Global Development Finance Report (pp. 136–39) indicates that,
in recent years, about 70 percent of China’s outstanding long-term external debt has been de-
nominated in U.S. dollars, and about 15 percent has been denominated in Japanese yen. Data
on the currency composition of short-term external debt are not available in this report.
7. Some of the analysis in section 9.3 draws upon work done by members of the IMF’s
China team.
8. The ﬁgure for 2003 includes the $45 billion used to recapitalize two state commercial
banks at the end of that year. Hence, the numbers reported in this table for foreign exchange
reserve accumulation during 2003 and the level of gross oﬃcial reserves at the end of 2003 are
higher by $45 billion than the corresponding oﬃcial ﬁgures. To understand the evolution of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.capital account, which in turn reﬂected robust FDI inﬂows on the order of
$30–40 billion a year. Interestingly, the errors and omissions category was
signiﬁcantly negative over this period (averaging about –$15 billion a year),
suggesting that unoﬃcial capital outﬂows were occurring at the same time
that signiﬁcant FDI inﬂows were coming in through oﬃcial channels.
Reserve accumulation then tapered oﬀ during 1998–2000, the years
right after the Asian crisis. A sharp rise in outﬂows on other investment
and large negative errors and omissions together oﬀset much of the eﬀect
of continued robust FDI inﬂows and a strong current account, the latter
reﬂecting an increase in the trade surplus.
The subsequent sharp increase in reserves since 2001 is noteworthy, par-
ticularly because it was accompanied by a sustained export boom and the
possibility—according to a number of observers and analysts—that the
renminbi may have become signiﬁcantly undervalued over this period.9 It
is instructive to compare the factors underlying the accumulation of re-
serves in 2001–3 relative to the previous three-year period.
Table 9.7 shows that the average annual increase in foreign exchange re-
serves during 2001–3 was an order of magnitude higher than during 1998–
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9. There is a considerable range of opinions about the degree of undervaluation of the ren-
minbi. IMF (2004) and Funke and Rahn (2005) conclude that there is no strong evidence that
the renminbi is substantially undervalued. Goldstein (2004) and Frankel (2004), on the other
hand, argue that the renminbi may be undervalued by at least 25–30 percent. Market analysts
have a similarly broad range of views.
Table 9.7 Decomposition of the recent reserve buildup (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Average Average  Average 
1998–2000 2001–2003 Change 2001–2004 Change
(1) (2) (2) – (1) (3) (3) – (1)
Foreign reserve increase 8.5 95.0 86.5 122.8 114.3
Current account balance 23.7 32.9 9.2 42.2 18.5
Capital account balance 0.3 55.0 54.7 69.3 69.0
FDI, net 38.5 43.8 5.3 46.6 8.1
Errors and omissions, net –15.4 7.1 22.5 11.4 26.8
Non-FDI capital account balance 
(including errors and omissions) –53.6 18.3 72.0 34.1 87.7
Sources: CEIC database, PBC, and authors’ calculations.
Notes:The numbers shown in this table are annual averages over the relevant periods (underlying annual
data are in table 9.6). Balance-of-payments data for 2004 that are used in the calculations in the last two
columns are very preliminary and are mostly taken from the PBC’s monetary policy report for 2004:Q4.
The numbers used for 2004 are as follows: increase in gross international reserves, $206.3 billion; current
account balance, $70.0 billion; capital account balance, $112.0 billion; FDI, net, $55 billion; errors and
omissions, net, $24.3 billion; non-FDI capital account balance, $81.3 billion. The 2004 ﬁgure for FDI
net is based on a reported gross inﬂow of about $60 billion and an assumed outﬂow of $5 billion (up from
about $3 billion in 2003). Net errors and omissions are calculated as a residual (and, hence, so is the non-
FDI capital account balance).2000. The current account surplus was on average larger in the latter pe-
riod, but it does not account for much of the increase in the pace of reserve
accumulation since 2001. Similarly, while FDI inﬂows are an important
contributor to reserve accumulation, there is little evidence of a major in-
crease in the pace of these inﬂows in the latter period. The most signiﬁcant
increase is in non-FDI capital inﬂows (including errors and omissions),
which swung from an average of –$53.6 billion in 1998–2000 to $18.3 bil-
lion in 2001–3, a turnaround of $72 billion on an annual basis. Errors and
omissions, in particular, changed from an average of –$15.4 billion in the
ﬁrst period to $7.1 billion in the second.
This decomposition is signiﬁcant as it shows that much of the recent in-
crease in the pace of reserve accumulation is potentially related to “hot
money” rather than a rising trade surplus or capital ﬂows such as FDI that
are viewed as being driven by fundamentals. In fact, the merchandise trade
balance has been relatively stable in the range of $35–45 billion since 1997.
The moderate increase in the average current account surplus is largely ac-
counted for by the surge in net transfers.
To better understand recorded non-FDI capital inﬂows, we examine more
detailed information from capital and ﬁnancial account transactions. Table
9.8 shows how the main items changed from 2000 to 2003. Of the total in-
crease of $96 billion in the capital and ﬁnancial account over this period, the
increases in net FDI inﬂows and net portfolio ﬂows account for $10 billion
and $15 billion, respectively. This leaves a substantial portion, about $71 bil-
lion, to be explained by other capital ﬂows. The two biggest increases, adding
up to about $60 billion, are in the categories of inward loans—representing
oﬀshore borrowing by Chinese households and ﬁrms—and other assets.
This includes signiﬁcant withdrawals of overseas lending by Chinese banks
in order to meet rising domestic demand for foreign currency–denominated
loans. The general direction of all of these ﬂows is consistent with expecta-
tions during this period of an appreciation of the renminbi.
Similarly, the large switch in the errors and omissions category could po-
tentially be indicative of unrecorded capital ﬂows into China, stimulated by
the prospect of an appreciation of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar. Such
speculative pressures may have been exacerbated by the positive interest di-
ﬀerential between China and the United States, which implies that investors
may have seen a move into renminbi-denominated instruments as essen-
tially a one-way bet, and one without even an associated carrying cost.
This raises the prospect that, as long as the perception of an underval-
ued renminbi persists—and unless the interest diﬀerential between China
and the United States narrows further or shifts—these speculative inﬂows
could continue. It should nevertheless be noted that, given the apparent
one-way bet on the renminbi, the fact that these ﬂows are not larger than
they are suggests that capital controls may be at least partially eﬀective.
In this context, it is worth trying to investigate in more detail where the un-
440 Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin Weirecorded ﬂows are coming from, how much larger could they be in the ab-
sence of capital controls, and how much money may try to ﬁnd its way
around the capital controls. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the money
ﬂowing in is primarily accounted for by a reversal of outﬂows from Chinese
households and corporations that took place during the 1990s to evade taxes
or to avoid losses associated with a possible depreciation of the renminbi. It
is diﬃcult to answer precisely the question of how much such money is out-
side of China and could potentially come back into the country.
We take the simple and admittedly naive approach of adding up errors
and omissions and portfolio ﬂows and labeling the total as hot money that
could potentially switch directions within a short time horizon. Figure 9.7
shows the amount of such hot money ﬂows over the past two decades.10The
The Chinese Approach to Capital Inﬂows 441
Table 9.8 Capital ﬂows under the ﬁnancial account (in billions of U.S. dollars)
2000 2003 Change in 
balance 
Balance Credit Debit Balance Credit Debit (2003 less 2000)
Financial account 2 92 90 98 220 122 96
Direct investment 37 42 5 47 56 8 10
Inward 38 41 2 47 54 6 9
Outward –1 1 2 0 2 2 1
Portfolio investment –4 8 12 11 12 1 15
Assets –11 0 11 3 3 0 14
Equity securities
Debt securities
Liabilities 7 8 0 8 9 1 1
Equity securities
Debt securities
Other investment –32 42 74 39 152 113 71
Assets –44 5 49 27 52 25 71
Trade credit –13 0 13 –1 0 1 11
Loans –18 0 19 14 22 8 32
Currency, deposits –6 1 7 –7 1 7 –1
Other assets –6 3 10 21 30 8 28
Liabilities 12 37 25 12 100 88 0
Trade credit 18 18 0 5 5 0 –14
Loans –2 –12 15 7 79 72 9
Currency, deposits 0 0 0 1 9 8 1
Other liabilities –3 7 10 0 7 7 3
Source: CEIC database.
10. Capital ﬂight through underinvoicing of exports or overinvoicing of imports may not
show up in the errors and omissions or any other part of the balance of payments statistics.
Net errors and omissions may also understate unrecorded capital ﬂows to the extent that there
are oﬀsetting unrecorded ﬂows on current and capital account transactions, or even among
transactions within each of these categories. Gunter (2004) estimates that capital ﬂight dur-
ing the 1990s may have been greater than suggested by such crude estimates.Fig. 9.7 Errors and omissions and portfolio investment, net (in billions of 
U.S. dollars)
Source: World Economic Outlook database.
Note: Data for 2004 are preliminary (see notes to table 9.6).lower panel shows that the cumulative amount of errors and omissions
since the early 1990s is quite large, peaking at about $150 billion, and the
recent swing has reversed at best a small part of this ﬂow. Under this inter-
pretation, there could potentially be signiﬁcant amounts of further inﬂows
if there continues to be a strong expectation of an appreciation of the ren-
minbi.
An alternative, and more benign, possibility is that the errors and omis-
sions category may in part reﬂect an accounting issue.11 China’s oﬃcially
reported holdings of foreign bonds are not marked to market in terms of
exchange rate valuations, while the stock of international reserves on the
People’s Bank of China’s (PBC’s) balance sheet does reﬂect these currency
valuation eﬀects. This implies, for instance, that any changes in the dollar
value of reserve holdings could end up in the balance of payments under
the errors and omissionscategory.12In the absence of published data on the
currency composition of foreign exchange reserves, it is widely believed
that a substantial fraction of China’s foreign exchange reserve holdings is
in U.S. treasury bonds, with the remainder in government bonds denomi-
nated in euros and other currencies.13 Given the recent large swings in the
value of the U.S. dollar, however, even modest holdings of reserves in in-
struments denominated in other major currencies could have a signiﬁcant
quantitative impact on the dollar value of gross reserves.
Table 9.9 shows the eﬀects of some simple simulations to illustrate how
large these valuation eﬀects could potentially be. For instance, in panel 
A, we assume that 80 percent of China’s foreign reserve holdings are in 
U.S. dollar–denominated instruments, with the remainder in euro-
denominated instruments. This calculation suggests that, in 2003, roughly
$16 billion, representing about 85 percent of the errors and omissions
amount for the year, could be accounted for by valuation changes on the
stock of reserves. In 2004, valuation changes could account for about $11
billion of unrecorded capital inﬂows, although, in the absence of full bal-
ance-of-payments data at this stage, one cannot tell how this ﬁts into the
bigger picture. But, as a share of the total change in reserves, valuation
eﬀects are clearly going to be a lot less important in 2004 than in 2003, both
because the underlying exchange rate changes were smaller and because
the change in reserves was larger in 2004.
The remaining panels of this table show how the results change under
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11. The calculations that follow are based upon unpublished work by Ray Brooks.
12. China does not report its international investment position, which would clarify this
matter.
13. There has been a great deal of recent interest in the share of Chinese oﬃcial reserve
holdings accounted for by U.S. dollar–denominated instruments, particularly treasury bonds.
The recent depreciation of the U.S. dollar has fueled speculation that China has been diversi-
fying away from U.S. dollar bonds into other currencies. Appendix A provides a detailed anal-
ysis, including some cautionary notes, about one source of data that has been used by many































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.diﬀerent assumptions about (a) the share of reserves held in U.S. dollar–
denominated bonds and (b) the other Group of Three (G3) currencies in
which the remainder of the reserves are held. The results generally seem to con-
ﬁrm the possibility that errors and omissions in recent years may, to a signiﬁ-
cant extent, reﬂect currency valuation eﬀects rather than unrecorded capital
inﬂows. This is clearly an issue that bears further investigation in the future.
9.3.2 Implications of the Recent Reserve Buildup
The fact that China’s capital inﬂows over the past decade have been
dominated by FDI is a positive outcome. As documented above, however,
non-FDI capital inﬂows have accounted for much of the recent surge in the
pace of reserve accumulation. This raises a question about whether, from
China’s domestic perspective, the continued rapid buildup of reserves is
desirable.
The literature on the optimal level of reserves (see, e.g., Aizenman and
Marion 2004 and references therein) does not provide a clear-cut way of an-
swering this question. The usefulness of a large stock of reserves is essen-
tially that, especially for a country with a ﬁxed exchange rate system, it can
be useful to stave oﬀ downward pressures on the exchange rate. The trade-
oﬀ results from the fact that developing-country reserves are typically held
in treasury bonds denominated in hard currencies. The rate of return on
these instruments is presumably lower than that which could be earned by
physical capital investment within the developing country, which would
typically have a scarcity of capital. In addition, the capital inﬂows that are
reﬂected in reserve accumulation could increase liquidity in the banking
system, creating potential problems in a weakly supervised banking system
because banks have an incentive to relax their prudential standards in order
to increase lending. Sterilization of capital inﬂows to avoid this outcome
could generate ﬁscal costs, because the rate of return on domestic steriliza-
tion instruments is typically higher than that earned on reserve holdings.
China, however, appears to be a special case in some respects. China’s
low (controlled) interest rates imply that, since its reserve holdings are be-
lieved to be held primarily in medium- and long-term industrial-country
treasury instruments and government agency bonds, there are in fact net
marginal beneﬁts to sterilization. This is of course enabled by domestic ﬁ-
nancial repression—with no eﬀective competition for the state-owned
banking sector—and capital controls.14 Furthermore, with domestic in-
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14. This suggests that there are implicit costs to these sterilization eﬀorts. However, deter-
mining the incidence of these costs is not straightforward; much of these costs is presumably
borne by depositors in the state banks. Recent data suggest that longer-term central bank bills
(original maturity of one year or longer) have replaced short-term bills as the primary steril-
ization instrument used by the Chinese authorities. This may have been driven by concerns
about frequently rolling over the stock of short-term bills. In addition, purchases of shorter-
term U.S. Treasury instruments appear to have increased (see appendix A). Thus, traditional
sterilization costs may also soon start coming into play.vestment rates of above 45 percent (supported mainly by domestic saving,
which is an order of magnitude larger than FDI inﬂows), capital scarcity is
apparently not a concern, and it is not obvious that the marginal return on
investment is higher than the rate of return on reserve holdings, particu-
larly in the likely scenario in which the allocation of capital remains the
sole prerogative of an improving but still ineﬃcient state banking system.15
Commonly used reserve adequacy indicators provide one way of assess-
ing the insurance value provided by reserve holdings (ﬁgure 9.8).16 China’s
reserve holdings provide comfortable coverage of its imports, more so than
most other emerging markets. The stock of reserves at the end of 2004 ac-
counted for about ﬁfty-three weeks’ worth of imports in that year (and for
about forty-three weeks of the IMF’s forecast of imports in 2005), signiﬁ-
cantly above the corresponding ﬁgures for most other emerging markets.
In terms of reserve coverage of short-term external debt, China outper-
forms virtually every other emerging market, with its reserves amounting
to more than ten times short-term external debt.17 One area where China’s
position looks less favorable relative to other emerging markets is the re-
serve coverage of the monetary base, which is a useful indicator of reserve
adequacy in the context of a currency peg. Reﬂecting the high degree of
monetization of the Chinese economy (the ratio of M2 to GDP at end 2004
was about 1.9), reserves cover only about 20 percent of M2.
As a related matter, in addition to providing a buﬀer to stave oﬀ any fu-
ture downward pressures on the ﬁxed exchange rate, the high level of re-
serves has in fact been cited as necessary to cushion the ﬁnancial sector
from external shocks. Reported nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the bank-
ing system amounted to about 30 percent of GDP in 2003 (see Prasad
2004), similar in magnitude to the stock of reserves, suggesting that the
present level of reserves could be used to ﬁnance a bailout of the banking
system if the need should arise. Indeed, the recapitalization of two major
state commercial banks at the end of 2003 using $45 billion of reserves is
indicative of the intention of the Chinese authorities to use reserve hold-
ings to help strengthen the books of state banks. However, there are con-
cerns that deﬁciencies in accounting practices and the reporting of NPLs
could mean that their true level is higher than the reported numbers. Fur-
thermore, the rapid expansion of credit during 2003 and the ﬁrst half of
2004 that contributed to an investment boom could result in a new wave of
problem loans in the future if the surge in investment results in excess
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15. See Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004) for evidence of low returns to lending by state
banks.
16. The cross-country comparison in ﬁgure 9.8 shows data only through 2003. The discus-
sion in this paragraph uses updated data for China through end 2004.
17. Figure 9.8 uses Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data on external debt that are,
in principle, comparable across countries. Based on oﬃcial Chinese data, reserves amount to
about six times the stock of short-term external debt, still above comparable ratios in almost
all other emerging markets.Fig. 9.8 Reserve adequacy indicators: A, reserves/imports (weeks of imports); 
B, reserves/short-term external debt; C, reserves/M2 (percentage)
Sources: IFS, DOT, WEO and Joint BIS/IMF/OECD/World Bank Statistics of External
Debt.
Note: In panel A, end-of-year reserves are shown as a ratio to the number of weeks’ worth of
imports in that year.
A
B
Ccapacity being built up in some sectors (Goldstein and Lardy 2004). This
could justify maintaining a high level of reserves.18
One risk associated with maintaining a high level of reserves, however, is
the vulnerability of the balance sheet of the PBC to changes in the indus-
trial country treasury yield curve. An upward shift in the yield curve could
signiﬁcantly reduce the mark-to-market value of Chinese holdings of in-
dustrial country treasury instruments.19 Similarly, an appreciation of the
currency relative to, for example, the U.S. dollar could lead to a fall in the
renminbi value of dollar-denominated treasury bond holdings. Since the
primary sterilization instrument in China—central bank bills—is denom-
inated in renminbi, this would lead to a net capital loss in domestic cur-
rency terms. Interestingly, this suggests that, at least on this dimension, the
costs of a move toward greater exchange rate ﬂexibility (which, under pres-
ent circumstances, is expected to lead to some appreciation of the renminbi
in the short run) could increase as the stock of reserves rises.20It could also
increase the incentive to diversify out of dollar assets and into other hard
currencies.
To summarize, there is no clear evidence that the buildup of reserves in
China has signiﬁcant direct sterilization costs, although it could have some
eﬃciency costs and also expose the balance sheet of the PBC to some ex-
change rate and capital risks, at least on a mark-to-market basis.
9.4 Viewing China’s Capital Inﬂows through the Prism 
of the Literature on Financial Globalization
It has long been an article of faith among most economists that interna-
tional capital ﬂows allow for a more eﬃcient global allocation of capital.
For capital-poor developing countries in particular, ﬁnancial integration
(with world capital markets) was seen as key to moving onto a high-growth
path. In addition, ﬁnancial integration in theory provides enhanced possi-
bilities for consumption smoothing through better sharing of income risk
across countries. Those developing countries that subscribed to this logic
by liberalizing their capital accounts starting in the mid-1980s—a group
that has come to be known as the emerging markets—captured the lion’s
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18. Preliminary indications are that the reported ratio of NPLs to GDP declined in 2004,
but this may be attributable partly to the transfer of some NPLs oﬀ the books of state com-
mercial banks.
19. One could argue that these notional capital losses in mark-to-market terms should not
be of concern if the Chinese authorities’ intention is to hold the bonds to maturity. This ar-
gument has validity only so long as the reserves do not need to be liquidated before maturity.
20. A related point is that if the accumulation of reserves continues apace, the potential cap-
ital loss from any appreciation would grow over time, suggesting that an earlier move toward
exchange rate ﬂexibility would be preferable from this narrow perspective (if such a move was
regarded as being inevitable). In any event, we doubt that this factor will play a signiﬁcant role
in inﬂuencing the timing of a move toward greater ﬂexibility.share of the net capital ﬂows from industrial to developing economies that
took place over the subsequent decade. Capital account liberalization
proved, however, to be a mixed blessing, with many emerging markets suf-
fering debilitating ﬁnancial and balance-of-payments crises in the late
1990s. But do the crises by themselves imply that ﬁnancial integration is
not advisable for developing countries? A closer look at the evidence is in
order.21
9.4.1 Financial Integration and Growth
In theory, there are a number of channels through which capital inﬂows
can help to raise economic growth in developing countries. These include
direct channels such as augmentation of domestic savings, lower cost of
capital, transfer of technology, and development of the domestic ﬁnancial
sector. Indirect channels include the inducements for better domestic poli-
cies oﬀered by capital account openness and the promotion of specializa-
tion of production. Theory drives one inexorably to the conclusion that ﬁ-
nancial integration must be good for growth.
The empirical evidence, however, paints a far more sobering picture. It
is true that emerging markets as a group have posted much higher growth
on average than other developing economies over the past two decades.
Notwithstanding the painful crises that many of them experienced, these
countries have done far better overall in terms of raising per capita in-
comes. However, this does not by itself imply a causal relationship. Indeed,
while there is a considerable divergence of results among diﬀerent studies,
the weight of the evidence seems to tilt toward the conclusion that it is diﬃ-
cult to ﬁnd a strong and robust causal link once one controls for other
factors that could aﬀect growth (Prasad et al. 2003 provide an extensive
survey of this literature). There is of course an element of endogeneity
here—ﬁnancial integration could induce countries to have better macro-
economic policies and improve their institutions, but this eﬀect would not
be picked up in a regression framework. However, there is at best mixed ev-
idence that ﬁnancial integration induces a country to pursue better macro-
economic policies (Tytell and Wei 2004). More research is needed on this
question, but the bottom line is that it is diﬃcult to make a prima facie case
that ﬁnancial integration provides a strong boost to growth in emerging
markets.
9.4.2 Financial Integration and Volatility
As for volatility, economic theory has the strong implication that access
to ﬁnancial markets—at either the household or the national level—must
be welfare enhancing from a consumption-smoothing perspective. So long
as aggregate shocks (at the relevant level of aggregation) are not dominant
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21. The discussion in section 9.4 draws on Prasad et al. (2003).in explaining variations in household or national income growth, ﬁnancial
markets should improve welfare by providing a mechanism that allows in-
dividual economic units to share their idiosyncratic income risk. The rea-
son countries (and households) like to do this, of course, is to smooth their
consumption growth and reduce the otherwise necessarily close linkage of
national consumption growth to national income growth and its intrinsic
volatility. Although some countries may not be able to take full advantage
of such risk-sharing opportunities (e.g., due to problems of monitoring
and moral hazard), access to international ﬁnancial markets should im-
prove their welfare—in terms of reducing consumption volatility—at least
marginally.
The reality for emerging markets is starkly diﬀerent. Recent research
suggests that, for these countries, the ratio of consumption growth volatil-
ity to output growth volatility in fact increased on average in the 1990s, pre-
cisely during the key period of ﬁnancial globalization (Kose, Prasad, and
Terrones 2003). Note that this result cannot be ascribed simply to the fact
that some of these countries experienced crises during this period. In prin-
ciple, a country should be able to do no worse than having its consumption
growth be as volatile as its income growth. Formal regression analysis con-
trolling for a variety of other determinants of volatility and growth sug-
gests the existence of a nonlinearity in the relationship between the degree
of ﬁnancial integration and the relative volatility of consumption growth.22
An increase in ﬁnancial integration from a low to a medium level tends
to be associated with a rise in the relative volatility of consumption growth.
At one end of the spectrum, for countries with very limited access to inter-
national ﬁnancial markets, consumption growth tends to be about as
volatile as income growth.23 At the other end, industrial countries, which
tend to be highly integrated into global ﬁnancial markets, appear to be able
to take advantage of ﬁnancial openness to eﬀectively reduce their relative
consumption growth volatility. For emerging markets, the problem of
course is that although international investors are willing to provide capi-
tal when times are good, these countries often lose access to international
capital markets when times are bad (see, e.g., Kaminsky, Reinhart, and
Végh 2004). Thus, sadly, it is precisely those countries that dip their toes
into the waters of ﬁnancial globalization that appear to be penalized by the
procyclical nature of their access to world capital markets.
The situation appears bleak. Developing countries need external capital
to grow. But is ﬁnancial integration just “snake oil”—delivering at best
weak growth eﬀects and exposing countries to higher volatility? The an-
swer, it turns out, depends.
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22. In this subsection, “relative” volatility of consumption growth should always be taken
to mean its volatility relative to that of income growth.
23. Even in a closed economy, of course, the existence of investment opportunities should
allow for some degree of intertemporal smoothing of national consumption.9.4.3 The Composition of Capital Inﬂows Matters
A large literature shows that it is not just the degree of ﬁnancial open-
ness, but also the composition of capital inﬂows, that determines the qual-
ity of a developing country’s experiences with globalization (see Prasad et
al. 2003 for a survey and additional references for the points made below).
For instance, FDI inﬂows tend to be far less volatile than other types of in-
ﬂows. In particular, FDI appears to be less subject to sharp reversals than
other types of inﬂows, particularly bank lending.24 External debt, on the
other hand, clearly increases vulnerability to the risks of ﬁnancial global-
ization. In particular, debt crises are more likely to occur in countries where
external debt is of relatively short maturity (see, e.g., Frankel and Rose
1996 and Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001).
The problem, of course, is that the composition of inﬂows and related
matters such as the maturity structure of external debt are not entirely un-
der the control of developing-country governments. Countries with weak
macroeconomic fundamentals are often forced to rely more on external
debt and end up having little choice but to borrow at short maturities. Fi-
nancial integration can in fact aggravate the risks associated with weak
macroeconomic policies. Access to world capital markets could lead to ex-
cessive borrowing that is channeled into unproductive government spend-
ing, ultimately increasing vulnerability to external shocks or changes in
investor sentiment. In addition, lack of transparency has been shown to be
associated with increased herding behavior by international investors,
which can destabilize ﬁnancial markets in an emerging market economy.
Furthermore, a high degree of corruption tends to adversely aﬀect the
composition of a country’s inﬂows, making it more vulnerable to the risks
of speculative attacks and contagion eﬀects.
Thus, the apparently negative eﬀects of globalization appear to be re-
lated to a particular kind of threshold eﬀect. Only countries with good in-
stitutions and sound macroeconomic policies tend to have lower vulnera-
bility to the risks associated with the initial phase of ﬁnancial integration
and are able to realize its full beneﬁts.
9.4.4 The Right Composition of Inﬂows for China
From a number of diﬀerent perspectives, China is a prototypical devel-
oping country that is best served by FDI rather than other types of in-
ﬂows. In the context of the above discussion on the beneﬁts and potential
risks of ﬁnancial globalization, the dominance of FDI in China’s capital
inﬂows implies that it has been able to control the risks and get more of
the promised beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration than many emerging mar-
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24. See Wei (2001). The evidence that net FDI ﬂows to emerging markets are less volatile
than portfolio ﬂows is weaker (see Dooley, Claessens, and Warner 1995; Wei 2001).kets that have taken a less cautious approach to capital account liberal-
ization.
FDI may have served China well in other ways also. Given the low level
of human capital and technical expertise in China, FDI could serve as a
useful conduit for importing technical and managerial know-how (Boren-
sztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 1998). Furthermore, the state-owned bank-
ing system is ineﬃcient at allocating credit. This system has improved over
time, particularly with the much-heralded end of the directed policy lend-
ing that these banks were forced to undertake until the late 1990s. However,
most bank credit still goes to the public sector, especially since, with the
controls on lending rates that existed until end October 2004, banks were
not able to price in the higher risk of lending to new and/or small ﬁrms in
the private sector (see Dunaway and Prasad 2004). As the experiences of
some of the Asian crisis countries have shown, a weakly supervised bank-
ing system that is allowed to raise funds abroad and channel them into the
domestic economy can generate serious imbalances. Thus, restrictions on
bank borrowing from abroad can serve a useful purpose.
With a ﬁxed exchange rate, openness to other types of ﬁnancial ﬂows,
which tend to be less stable and are subject to sudden stops or reversals,
would be less advisable. For instance, external borrowing by banks could
cause instability in exchange markets and would have at best dubious
eﬀects on growth. Substantial opening of the capital account would also be
inadvisable in this context, which suggests that the sort of selective open-
ing that China has pursued may have some advantages (see Prasad, Rum-
baugh, and Wang 2005).
9.5 What Explains the Composition of China’s Capital Inﬂows?
China appears to have beneﬁted from a pattern of capital inﬂows heav-
ily tilted toward FDI. A key question is how China has attained such a
composition of its inﬂows, one that many emerging markets aspire to but
that few achieve. Some context is important before addressing this ques-
tion. Earlier work by Wei (2000c) suggests that the size of FDI inﬂows into
China relative to its GDP and other “natural” determinants is not unusu-
ally high. If anything, China seems to be an underperformer as a host of
FDI from the world’s ﬁve major source countries. In more recent years,
with the continued rise in FDI, China may have become a normal country
in terms of its attractiveness as a destination for FDI.
One explanation for the composition of China’s capital inﬂows is that
it is the result of a pragmatic strategy that has been adjusted over time
through trial and error. The pattern in the 1980s and early 1990s could well
have reﬂected a combination of inertia and luck, with the post-1997 pat-
tern reﬂecting the scare of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, at the begin-
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capital inﬂows of any kind.
The early stage of reform sought to import only the type of foreign cap-
ital that was thought to help transmit technical and marketing know-how;
thus, the policy enunciated was “welcome to FDI, but no thank you to for-
eign debt and portfolio ﬂows.” Export performance and foreign exchange
balance requirements were initially imposed even on foreign-invested
ﬁrms. The restrictions on FDI were relaxed step by step, together with cer-
tain “supernational treatment” (of incentives) for foreign-owned enter-
prises and joint ventures. Over time, the government also started to relax
restrictions on foreign borrowing by corporations (and take steps to ex-
pand the set of Chinese stocks listed on Shanghai’s B-share market and the
Hong Kong and U.S. stock exchanges). The government declared in the
mid-1990s that it intended to implement capital account convertibility by
2000.
The psychological impact of the subsequent Asian ﬁnancial crisis may
have been profound. Several countries that China had regarded as role
models for its own development process (especially Korea) went into deep
crises in a very short period of time. It was a common perception among
policymakers in China that the swings in the non-FDI part of the interna-
tional capital ﬂows had played a crucial role in the process. In this sense,
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis caused a rethinking of the Chinese approach to
capital inﬂows. The idea of capital account liberalization by 2000 disap-
peared, and in its place rose the notion that the higher the level of foreign
exchange reserves, the better the chance of avoiding painful crises.
9.5.1 Incentives and Distortions Aﬀecting FDI
A more traditional explanation for the composition of China’s capital
inﬂows is that the unusually high share of FDI could reﬂect a policy mix of
simultaneously discouraging foreign debt and foreign portfolio inﬂows
while providing incentives for FDI.25 Indeed, the existence of tax beneﬁts
for FDI has meant that, until recently, the playing ﬁeld was in fact tilted in
favor of foreign-funded ﬁrms. This was conceivably a part of an enlight-
ened policy choice, which included restricting other types of inﬂows using
capital controls.
Since China promulgated laws governing foreign investment at the start
of the reform, the government has oﬀered generous tax treatment to for-
eign ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst two years that a foreign-invested ﬁrm makes a proﬁt,
it is exempt from corporate income tax. In subsequent years, foreign com-
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25. Tseng and Zebregs (2002) discuss other factors that may have helped to attract FDI,
such as market size, infrastructure, and the establishment of open economic zones, which
have more liberal investment and trade regimes than other areas.panies are subject to an average corporate income tax of 15 percent, less
than half the normal rate of 33 percent paid by Chinese companies.
Tax exemptions and reductions constitute only one aspect of govern-
ment incentives favoring FDI. To capture these incentives more compre-
hensively and to place the Chinese FDI regime in a cross-country compar-
ative context, we now make use of the description of the legal FDI regimes
for forty-nine countries in 2000 constructed by Wei (2000b), who in turn re-
lied on detailed textual descriptions prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) in a series of country reports entitled “Doing Business and Invest-
ing in [the country that is the subject of the report].” The “Doing Business
and Investing in . . .” series is written for multinational ﬁrms that intend to
do business in a particular country. They are collected in one CD-ROM
titled “Doing Business and Investing Worldwide” (PwC 2000). For each
country, the relevant PwC country report covers a variety of legal and reg-
ulatory issues of interest to foreign investors, including restrictions on for-
eign investment and investors (typically chapter 5), investment incentives
(typically chapter 4), and taxation of foreign corporations (typically chap-
ter 16).
To convert the textual information in these reports into numerical codes,
we read through the relevant chapters for all countries that the PwC series
covers. PwC (2000) contains information on incentives for FDI in the fol-
lowing four categories:
1. Existence of special incentives to invest in certain industries or cer-
tain geographic areas
2. Tax concessions speciﬁc to foreign ﬁrms (including tax holidays and
tax rebates, but excluding tax concessions speciﬁcally designed for export
promotion, which is in a separate category)
3. Cash grants, subsidized loans, reduced rent for land use, or other
nontax concessions, speciﬁc to foreign ﬁrms
4. Special promotion for exports (including existence of export pro-
cessing zones, special economic zones, etc.)
For each category of incentives, we then created a dummy variable,
which takes the value 1 if a particular type of incentive is present. An over-
all “FDI incentives” variable can then be constructed as the sum of the
above four dummies. This variable takes a value of zero if there is no in-
centive in any of the categories, and 4 if there are incentives in all of them.
Of the forty-nine countries for which one can obtain information, none
has incentives in all four categories. The median number of incentives is 1
(mean  1.65). China is one of only three countries that have incentives for
FDI in three categories—the other two countries being Israel and Egypt.
Therefore, based on this information, we might conclude that China oﬀers
more incentives to attract FDI than most countries in the world.
Of course, legal incentives are not the only things that matter for inter-
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at legal restrictions. The same PwC source also oﬀers information, in a
standardized format, on the presence or absence of restrictions in four
areas:
1. Existence of foreign exchange control (which may interfere with for-
eign ﬁrms’ ability to import intermediate inputs or repatriate proﬁts
abroad)
2. Exclusion of foreign ﬁrms from certain strategic sectors (particularly
national defense and mass media)
3. Exclusion of foreign ﬁrms from additional sectors that would other-
wise be open in most developed countries
4. Restrictions on foreign ownership (e.g., they may not per permitted
100 percent ownership)
We generated dummy variables for each category of restrictions and cre-
ated an overall “FDI restriction” variable that is equal to the sum of those
four dummies. This variable takes the value of zero if there is no restriction
in any category, and 4 if there are restrictions in all of them.
The median number of restrictions is 1 (mean   1.69). Interesting,
China is one of only ﬁve countries in the sample that place restrictions on
FDI in all four categories. Diﬀerent restrictions and incentives may have
diﬀerent eﬀects on FDI, so they cannot be assigned equal weights. Not-
withstanding this caveat, in terms of the overall legal regime, it is not ob-
vious that China makes for a particularly attractive FDI destination (as of
2000).26
So far, we have been discussing explicit incentives and restrictions that
are written into laws and regulations. Of course, there can be many other
implicit incentives or restrictions that are nonetheless an important part of
the overall investment climate in the mind of potential investors. For ex-
ample, corruption and bureaucratic red tape raise business costs and are
part of the implicit disincentives for investment. Statistical analyses by Wei
(2000a, 2000b, 2000c) suggest that these costs are economically as well as
statistically signiﬁcant.
To sum up, while the Chinese laws and regulations oﬀer many legal in-
centives to attract FDI, they should be placed in context along with many
implicit disincentives as well as explicit legal restrictions in order to form a
more complete assessment of the overall investment climate.
9.5.2 A Mercantilist Story
Another hypothesis for explaining China’s pattern of capital inﬂows is
that the encouragement of FDI inﬂows is part of a mercantilist strategy to
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26. The regression analysis in Wei (2000b, 2001) suggests that these FDI incentive and re-
striction variables explain a part of the cross-country variation in inward FDI.foster export-led growth, abetted by the maintenance of an undervalued
exchange rate (see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2004a, 2004b;
henceforth DFG). The basic premise of DFG is that, with a large pool of
surplus labor and a banking system that is assumed to be irremediably
ineﬃcient, a more appropriate growth strategy for China is to use FDI to
spur “good” investment in the export sector and to maintain an underval-
ued exchange rate in order to maintain export competitiveness. To support
this equilibrium, China allows manufacturers in its export markets (the
U.S. market in particular) to bring in FDI and take advantage of the cheap
labor to reap substantial proﬁts, thereby building a constituency in the
United States to inhibit any action to force China to change its exchange
rate regime. In addition, China’s purchase of U.S. government securities as
a part of its reserve holdings acts as a collateral or insurance policy for for-
eign ﬁrms that invest in China.
While this is an intriguing story, the facts do not support it. For instance,
most of the FDI inﬂows into China have come from countries that are ex-
porting to China rather than importing from it (see section 9.2). Further-
more, it is worth noting that (a) China chose not to devalue in 1997–98,
even though that would have increased its exports; (b) the massive buildup
of foreign exchange reserves is a relatively recent phenomenon; and (c) for
much of the two decades up to 2001, the Chinese currency was likely to be
overvalued rather than undervalued according to the black market pre-
mium. Even if one were to accept the DFG approach as a sustainable one,
there is a conceptual question of whether it is the right approach. To take
just one aspect, the sheer size of domestic saving (more than $500 billion a
year) eclipses FDI (at about $45–50 billion a year, an order of magnitude
smaller). Hence, writing oﬀ the domestic banking sector and focusing
solely on FDI-led growth can hardly be regarded as a reasonable strategy.
In short, while the DFG story is a seductive one and has many plausible el-
ements, it does not appear to be a viable overall approach to fostering sus-
tainable growth in China.27
9.5.3 Institutions and Governance
A diﬀerent possibility, suggested by the work of Yasheng Huang (2003),
is that the dominant share of FDI in China’s inﬂows over the past decade
reﬂects deﬁciencies in domestic capital markets. In particular, private ﬁrms
have faced discrimination relative to state-owned enterprises, from both
the banking system (in terms of loan decisions by state-owned banks) and
the equity market (in terms of approval of stock listings). As a result,
private ﬁrms have taken advantage of pro-FDI policies in an unexpected
way and used foreign joint ventures as a way to acquire needed capital in
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27. Roubini (2004) and Goldstein and Lardy (2005) present broader arguments against the
DFG story.order to undertake investment. Foreign investors have presumably been
willing to go along because they are appropriately compensated by their
Chinese partners in the form of proﬁt shares, even in cases where the for-
eign investors may have no particular technological, managerial, or mar-
keting know-how to oﬀer. If the Chinese ﬁnancial system had no such dis-
crimination in place, much of the foreign investment in the form of joint
ventures might not have taken place. In this sense, the deﬁciency of the do-
mestic ﬁnancial system may have artiﬁcially raised the level of inward FDI.
This is an interesting hypothesis and may well explain part of the inward
FDI in the 1980s. However, there is some mismatch between this hypothe-
sis and the data, especially in terms of the time series patterns of FDI in-
ﬂows. On the one hand, inward FDI has been increasing at a rapid rate—
indeed, more than half of the cumulative stock of inward FDI can be
accounted for by recent inﬂows over the period 1998–2003. This hypothe-
sis would require a ﬁnancial system ever more discriminatory of private
ﬁrms. On the other hand, domestic banks have become increasingly will-
ing to make loans to non-state-owned ﬁrms. Similarly, in the equity mar-
ket, both the absolute number and the relative share of the non-state-
owned ﬁrms in the two stock exchanges have been rising. Therefore, it
seems to us that Huang’s hypothesis is unlikely to be a major part of the ex-
planation for the rapid rise in inward FDI in recent years.
Governance, which includes various aspects of public administration, is
another potentially important determinant of the composition of inﬂows.
Unlike other types of inﬂows, FDI that is used to build plants with joint
ownership by Chinese entrepreneurs provides foreign investors with the
best possibility of being able to successfully negotiate the bureaucratic
maze in China. However, this is somewhat at odds with recent literature
that has examined the role of weak institutions (e.g., those with a high level
of corruption, lack of transparency, weak judicial system) in the volume
and patterns of capital inﬂows. Low levels of transparency typically tend
to discourage international portfolio investment (Gelos and Wei 2005).
Weak public governance—especially rampant insider trading—tends to
exacerbate stock market volatility, further discouraging foreign portfolio
inﬂows (Du and Wei 2004). High corruption also tends to discourage FDI
(Wei 2000a, 2000b). However, taken together, these factors are unlikely to
explain the particular composition of the Chinese capital inﬂows, since
weak public governance by itself should tend to tilt the composition away
from FDI and toward foreign debt (Wei and Wu 2002).
It is not easy to empirically disentangle the various hypotheses that we
have reviewed above to explain why China gets more FDI than other types
of inﬂows. In our view, the nature of the capital controls regime and the in-
centives for FDI appear to have played a big part in encouraging FDI in-
ﬂows. But the story is not quite that straightforward, since one would ex-
pect a counteracting eﬀect from factors such as weak governance, legal
The Chinese Approach to Capital Inﬂows 457restrictions on investment by foreigners, and poor legal infrastructure and
property rights. Furthermore, it is useful to keep in mind that FDI inﬂow
ﬁgures may have been artiﬁcially inﬂated by the incentives for disguising
other forms of inﬂows as FDI in order to get around capital account re-
strictions and to take advantage of tax and other policies favoring FDI.
9.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have provided an overview of developments in China’s
capital inﬂows and analyzed the composition of these inﬂows in the con-
text of a rapidly burgeoning literature on ﬁnancial globalization. We have
also examined a number of hypotheses for China’s success in attracting
FDI inﬂows. Further research will be needed to disentangle the competing
explanations for this phenomenon, but there is little evidence that mercan-
tilist stories are the right answer. Understanding the reasons for China’s
success in tilting inﬂows toward FDI is important, especially as China
continues its integration into world ﬁnancial market and becomes more
exposed to the vagaries of these markets. China has done well so far in
managing the risks associated with ﬁnancial globalization, but major
challenges remain to ensure that continued integration with ﬁnancial mar-
kets does not worsen the risk-return trade-oﬀ.
Appendix A
Some Information on China’s Foreign Holdings 
of U.S. Dollar Securities
China does not publicly report the currency composition of its foreign ex-
changereserves.28With its reserves at well over $600 billion and continuing
to rise, there is growing interest in the question of what currencies and
maturities these reserves are held in. The U.S. Treasury International Capi-
tal (TIC) System database is a popular source of data for attempting to
shed some light on this issue. This appendix provides some information
on China’s holdings of U.S. dollar–denominated instruments that can be
gleaned from this source—including a discussion of what can and cannot
be learned from these data—and reviews the major caveats that should be
kept in mind while analyzing these data.
One of the main TIC databases provides information on U.S. transac-
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28. We are grateful to Eisuke Okada for his help in preparing this appendix and to Carol
Bertaut for helping us to understand these data better. The descriptions and data reported
here are taken from the U.S. Treasury web site: http://www.treas.gov/tic.tions with foreigners in long-term domestic and foreign securities. The data
are based on mandatory reports ﬁled by banks, securities dealers, in-
vestors, and other entities resident in the United States that deal directly
with foreign residents in purchases and sales of long-term securities—
composed of equity and debt issues with an original maturity of more than
one year—that are issued by the U.S. government and U.S. ﬁrms or by for-
eign governments and foreign-based ﬁrms.
These data reﬂect only transactions between U.S. residents and counter-
parties located outside the United States. Because they are designed to
capture cross-border transactions on a U.S. balance-of-payments basis,
these data do not necessarily indicate the country of beneﬁcial owner or is-
suer, or the currency of denomination of securities.29This implies that pur-
chases of U.S. securities by China could be signiﬁcantly understated if any
of these purchases are routed through ﬁnancial intermediaries in other
countries. Purchases of U.S. dollar–denominated instruments outside the
United States would also not be captured here. Another key issue is that
these numbers include not just purchases by central banks but also those
by other ﬁnancial institutions.
A diﬀerent TIC data source, “U.S. Banking Liabilities to Foreigners,” re-
ports data on foreign holdings of short-term treasury bills and notes. The
data from these two TIC sources are combined into a table showing major
foreign holders of treasury securities that is available on the U.S. Treasury
website. This table shows stock data including holdings of short-term
treasury bills and certiﬁcates, estimated holdings of long-term treasury se-
curities, and a small amount of nonmarketable treasury bonds and notes
issued to foreigners.30 The monthly ﬁgures for holdings of long-term treas-
ury securities since end June 2003, for example, begin with accurate data
for end June from the annual survey of foreign holdings of U.S. securities
as of that date. Holdings are then estimated for the end of each successive
month by adding to the previous month’s ﬁgure the net foreign transac-
tions in treasury bills, notes, and bonds during the month as reported in the
securities transactions data. This process of estimation has created a data
series with breaks at each new survey of foreign holdings of U.S. securities,
which generally takes place every year or two.
There are country identiﬁcation problems with these data as well. First, a
custodial bias is introduced in the survey data when foreign owners of treas-
ury securities entrust the safekeeping of their securities to ﬁnancial institu-
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29. For instance, if an intermediary in London were used by someone in India to buy a U.S.
or Mexican security in the United States, that transaction would be recorded opposite the
United Kingdom, not India.
30. Foreign holdings of short-term treasury bills are recorded at face value. Holdings of and
transactions in long-term treasury securities are collected at market value (including com-
missions and taxes in the case of the transactions data), although no change is made to adjust
these data to account for price changes occurring subsequent to the survey or transaction
dates. Holdings of nonmarketable securities are included at current value.tions in third countries. Second, since a large volume of cross-border trans-
actions takes place in major international ﬁnancial centers, the procedure
of adding net transactions to the original survey positions for long-term
marketable securities can generate large geographic distortions over time.
Data on net purchases of treasury bills (with original maturities of less
than one year) can be derived from changes in the stock data for treasury
bills as reported in “U.S. Banking Liabilities to Foreigners.”
Panel A of table 9A.1shows the net purchases of treasury bills and long-
term domestic and foreign securities in the United States that are recorded
against China. Over the period 2001–4, treasury instruments constitute
about 43 percent of total net purchases over the period 2001–4, and gov-
ernment agency bonds account for 40 percent. One important point to
note is that, during 2001–3, net purchases of government agency bonds ex-
ceeded purchases of treasury instruments by China. Another interesting
point is that in 2004 net purchases of shorter-term treasury bills increased
sharply, becoming as important as purchases of long-term treasury securi-
ties and government agency bonds.
How much of China’s reserve accumulation could potentially be ac-
counted for by these ﬂows? Panel B of table 9A.1 shows the ratio of net pur-
chases of treasury bills and long-term securities in the United States to
China’s foreign exchange reserve accumulation. This ratio has ﬂuctuated
considerably over the years.31 It has fallen sharply in recent years, from
over 1 in 2001 to 0.33 in 2004, suggesting a drop-oﬀ in the share of reserve
accumulation that is ﬂowing into U.S. instruments.
Panel C of table 9A.1 shows that China is now a large holder of U.S.
Treasury securities (the second largest, in fact, behind only Japan). As of
December 2004, China accounted for $194 billion of outstanding U.S.
Treasury securities recorded against foreign holders (compared to $712
billion for Japan and $164 billion for the United Kingdom). Under some
strong assumptions, these numbers could be read as suggesting that, as
of December 2004, about 30 percent of China’s foreign exchange reserves
were held in U.S. Treasury instruments, down from 41 percent in January
2003. But the caveat about inadequate coverage of the TIC data may be es-
pecially relevant here.
Overall, one could infer suggestive evidence from the data presented in
this appendix that China’s purchases of U.S. Treasury securities and other
U.S. dollar–denominated holdings may be accounting for a smaller pro-
portion of its accumulation of foreign exchange reserves than in the past.
These data should, however, be interpreted with extreme caution since they
are subject to serious shortcomings (as clearly noted on the TIC web site
itself, from which we have drawn many of the caveats discussed above).
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Evolution of Capital Controls in China
This appendix provides an extensive chronology of controls on capital ac-
count transactions over the period 1980–January 2005.32 It is drawn from
the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions (various issues). Following a detailed description of controls ex-
isting in 1980, changes to those restrictions in each subsequent year are
then listed. The reporting format for the capital account transactions
changed in 1996, the year in which China accepted the obligations of Ar-
ticle VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Another detailed overview
of the restrictions in place at the end of 1996 is therefore provided, followed
by a listing of changes to those restrictions in subsequent years.
Existing Controls on Capital Transactions as of December 31, 1980
A policy of permitting foreign borrowing on a planned basis has been in-
stituted. Loans for vital projects or projects that have a rapid rate of return
are given priority approval. All sections and departments wishing to bor-
row abroad must prepare a plan showing the kinds of imports for which the
loan is intended. Such plans must show the amount of foreign exchange
needed and how much of this will be earned and how much borrowed from
abroad. All such plans are submitted to the State Planning Commission,
which reviews them in cooperation with the Foreign Investment Control
Commission. If the imports are for new construction, the plans are also re-
viewed by the State Construction Commission (all three commissions are
under the supervision of the State Council).
Approval of foreign loans is based on a consideration of the need for for-
eign capital, and the ability of the borrowing unit to repay, and the overall
debt-service ratio of China. Most loans are made through the Bank of
China or, in the case of some loans to provinces or enterprises that are able
to repay the loan themselves, with Bank of China guarantees. External
borrowing plans by entities other than the Bank of China must be submit-
ted to the State General Administration of Exchange Control (SGAEC)
and the Foreign Investment Control Commission for approval, before
loans from abroad or from the Hong Kong and Macao regions can be in-
curred. Resident organizations may not issue securities for foreign ex-
change unless approved by the State Council.
All foreign investment projects are subject to the approval of the Foreign
Investment Control Commission. The policy with respect to foreign capi-
tal is designed both to make up the insuﬃciency of domestic capital and to
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32. We are indebted to Qing Wang for his help in preparing this appendix.facilitate the introduction of modern technology and management. All
foreign exchange earned by joint ventures should be kept in a Bank of
China account. Transfers of capital require SGAEC approval. When a
joint venture is wound up, the net claims belonging to the foreign investor
may be remitted with SGAEC approval through the foreign exchange ac-
count of the joint venture. Alternatively, the foreign investor may apply for
repayment of his paid-in capital.
Proﬁts of joint ventures, besides ﬁrms in special export zones and those
exploiting petroleum, natural gas, and other resources, are subject to tax at
33 percent (30 percent basis rate plus a 10 percent surcharge on the as-
sessed tax). As mentioned above, remitted proﬁts are subject to an addi-
tional tax of 10 percent. A joint venture scheduled to operate for ten years
or more may be exempted from income tax in the ﬁrst year of operation
and be allowed a 50 percent reduction for the second and third years. Joint
ventures in low-proﬁt operations, or those located in remote, economically
underdeveloped outlying areas, may be allowed a further 15–30 percent re-
duction in income tax for the following ten years. A participant in a joint
venture that reinvests its share of proﬁt in China for a period of not less
than ﬁve years may obtain a refund of 40 percent of the tax paid on the
reinvested amount. Some joint ventures concluded before the passing of
tax regulations in August 1980 are subject to taxes at diﬀerent rates.
Foreign investment by Chinese enterprises is subject to approval; proﬁts
thereby earned must be sold to the Bank of China, except for a working
balance. Chinese diplomatic and commercial organizations abroad and
undertakings abroad and in Hong Kong and Macao are required to draw




January 1. The Law on Income Taxes for Foreign Enterprises, which was
adopted by the National People’s Congress on December 13, 1981, came
into force.
January 30.The State Council promulgated regulations on the exploitation
of oﬀshore petroleum resources in cooperation with foreign enterprises.
March 6. The Bank of China decided (a) to grant foreign currency loans at
preferential interest rates to support the development of export com-
modities, projects of energy saving most pressing to the state, technical
transformation of enterprises of light industries (including the textile
and engineering industries), purchases by domestic enterprises of raw
and semiﬁnished materials in short supply, and projects of the packing
The Chinese Approach to Capital Inﬂows 463industry; and (b) to ﬁnance export services relating to projects con-
tracted with foreign countries.
Changes during 1983
January 1. The tax rate on income earned by foreign ﬁrms from interest on
loans in respect of contracts signed during the period of 1983–85 was re-
duced by 50 percent; a similar reduction was extended to income earned
from agriculture, energy development, communications and transport,
education, and scientiﬁc research.
August 1. New rules (approved by the State Council on July 19, 1983) were
introduced for the implementation of exchange controls in respect of en-
terprises with foreign and overseas Chinese capital and joint ventures.
September 2. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
approved certain changes in the income tax law for joint ventures.
September 20. The State Council issued a body of regulations for the im-
plementation of the law on joint ventures involving China and foreign
capitals.
Changes during 1984
January 23. The State Council announced that Shanghai region would be
given the authority to approve FDI projects to a value of up to US$10
million.
April 27.The State Council announced that fourteen selected coastal cities
would be allowed to open up further to the outside world, in order to
help speed up the introduction of advanced foreign technologies, no-
tably through FDI.
May 3.The harbor city of Beihai, one of the fourteen coastal cities selected
by the State Council for wider opening up to the outside world, was oﬃ-
cially designated as an economic and technological development zone
opened to FDI by small and medium-sized electronics and light indus-
try enterprises. Foreign nationals investing in Beihai would be given a
preferential tax treatment similar to that prevailing in the four special
economic zones.
June 6. The municipality of Shanghai announced that foreigners investing
in the economic and technological development zone in Shanghai would
be given preferential tax treatment in regard to local income tax, com-
parable to the tax treatment provided in the Shenzhen economic zones.
July 14. As part of various steps announced by the State Council with the
objective of speeding up a wider opening up of the fourteen designated
coastal cities to the outside world, it was decided that these cities would
not have the status of the existing special economic zones but would be
allowed, at their own initiative, to oﬀer additional tax incentives to for-
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could set up special economic and technological development areas
where the 10 percent tax on proﬁts remitted abroad by foreign investors
would be waived. As in the special economic zones, the proﬁts of joint
venture established in the designated areas would be subject to a 15 per-
cent income tax, and machinery, equipment, and other inputs imported
by or for joint ventures operating in the fourteen coastal cities would be
exempt from customs duties as well as from the consolidated industrial
and commercial tax. Exports would also be exempt from export duties,
and a certain proportion of products requiring advanced manufacturing
techniques would be permitted to be marketed domestically.
July 31. Joint ventures operating in the fourteen coastal cities were for-
mally made subject to an income tax of only 15 percent (instead of the
standard 33 percent), with the approval of the Ministry of Finance. In
addition, the 10 percent tax on onward remittances of foreign invest-
ment income would be waived if the foreign investment was undertaken
in designated economic and technological development areas in these
cities.
August 20. Special foreign currency lending facilities were set up by the
Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China for
domestic borrowers to help ﬁnance imports of advanced foreign tech-
nology.
September 1. Authorization was granted for the State Administration of
Exchange Control (SAEC) and the Bank of China to settle payments of
outstanding foreign currency debts of foreign and overseas Chinese
banks in China (including branches undergoing or already in liquida-
tion) that were contracted through 1949.
November 7. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was author-
ized to carry out business transactions in foreign exchange in the special
economic zones.
November 19. New provisional regulations concerning the application of
income taxes and the consolidated industrial and commerce tax in the
special economic zones and in the new technology development zone in
fourteen newly opened-up coastal cities were issued by the State Coun-
cil. The income taxes payable by joint ventures in the speciﬁed zones and
areas would be reduced from the standard rate of 33 percent to 15 per-
cent, with the approval of the Ministry of Finance. Income taxes for
other long-term industrial, communication, transport, agricultural, and
service trade undertakings in their ﬁrst one or two proﬁt-taking years
would be waived with the approval of the taxation authority, and reduc-
tions of 50 percent would be allowed in the following two or three years,
but proﬁts made by the older sectors of the fourteen coastal cities would
be subject to taxation by up to 80 percent of the standard tax rate of 33
percent. In addition, consolidated industrial and commercial tax ex-
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raw materials, building supplies, spare parts, other speciﬁed inputs, and
exports other than those controlled by the state. Foreign participants in
the joint ventures in these zones and areas were also allowed to remit
their share of the proﬁts overseas tax free, but a 10 percent tax was levied
on income from royalties, dividends, interest, and rentals, compared
with the standard rate of 20 percent elsewhere in China. The exemption
and reductions of income tax were made applicable to the whole of 1984,
while the exemption and reductions of industrial and commercial con-
solidated tax were to take eﬀect from December 1, 1984.
December 13.In a move aimed at attracting FDI, the municipal authorities
of Shanghai announced new concessions on tax and other policies, in-
cluding reduced customs duties and preferential access to speciﬁed do-
mestic markets. In addition, the income tax could, with approval from
the Ministry of Finance, be decreased to 15 percent on condition that
the project be operated with advanced technology or that the investment
be for over US$30 million, and customs duties on certain imported
equipment and raw materials could be waived.
December 22. Foreign banks were allowed to accept deposits from foreign
organizations, nonresidents, enterprises with foreign capital as well as
capital belong to overseas Chinese, and Chinese and foreign joint ven-
tures, and to make loans in foreign currency in Shanghai.
Changes during 1985
January 3. New plans to open four large industrial regions to foreign in-
vestment and trade were announced. The move represented the third
stage in China’s current open-door policy, following experiments in the
four special economic zones and the fourteen coastal cities.
March 14. Regulations governing the establishment of foreign joint ven-
tures in Shanghai were relaxed.
March 15. China and India signed a three-year agreement to develop eco-
nomic and trade relations; the accord provided for encouraging joint
ventures, the creating of consultancy services, the exchange of eco-
nomic, trade, and technical delegations; and participation in interna-
tional fairs in the two countries.
March 26. The Foreign Economic Contract Law was adopted.
April 1. The Chinese Patent Law, enacted in 1984, came into eﬀect. In ad-
dition, China joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property.
April 1. The Ministry of Petroleum and Industry announced that foreign
oil companies would be allowed to participate in exploration and devel-
opment of oil and gas reserves in nine provinces and one autonomous re-
gion.
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banks and joint venture banks in special economic zones.
August 22. China approved the establishment of the ﬁrst foreign branch
bank oﬃce in the country since 1949. In addition, the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) announced a plan to begin
branch operations in Shenzhen, a special economic zone, in October
1985.
November 6. China and Libya signed a protocol aimed at consolidating bi-
lateral cooperation between the two countries.
December 3. A joint venture bank, the ﬁrst with foreign capital participa-
tion, was opened in Xiamen, a special economic zone, with the Panin




February 5. Provisional regulations were approved permitting ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and enterprises with sources of foreign exchange income to
guarantee foreign exchange obligations of other debtors.
August 27. Provisional regulations were issued on a new system requiring
the timely registration of external borrowing with the State Administra-
tion of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).
Changes during 1988
April 13. The National People’s Congress adopted a new Chinese-foreign
cooperative joint ventures law.
Changes during 1989
February 14. The State Council issued regulations that all foreign com-
mercial borrowing required the approval of the People’s Bank of China
(PBC). All commercial borrowing is to be channeled through one of ten
domestic entities—the Bank of China, the Communications Bank of
China, the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, the
China Investment Bank, and six regional international trust and invest-
ment corporations. The short-term debt of each entity may not exceed
20 percent of the entity’s total debt, and short-term borrowing is to be
used only for working capital purposes.
March 6. The SAEC announced procedures governing Chinese direct in-
vestment abroad. Such investments would require government and
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triation of dividends and other income from the investment, and repa-
triation of earnings within six months.
Changes during 1990
April 4.The National People’s Congress adopted an amendment to the law
on Chinese foreign equity joint ventures. The amendment stipulated
that the state would not nationalize joint ventures, simpliﬁed the ap-
proval procedures for new foreign investment enterprises (requiring a
decision by the competent government authority within three months),
and extended the management rights of foreigners (including permitting
foreigners to assume the chairmanship of the board of directors of joint
ventures).
May 14. The Shanghai City Government announced plans for the devel-
opment of the Pudong New Area (an area adjacent to Shanghai that
covers 135 square miles). It was envisaged that the multibillion-dollar
project would take thirty to forty years to complete. To attract foreign
capital into the area, Chinese foreign joint ventures were to be oﬀered
tax incentives similar to those available in the special economic zones,
and overseas businesses would be permitted to invest in the construction
of airports, ports, railways, highways, and utilities, as well as to open for-
eign bank branches in Shanghai. Detailed regulations were announced
in October 1990.
May 19. The State Council issued regulations for the sale and transfer of
land use rights in cities and towns to encourage foreign investors to plan
long-term investment. Under these regulations, companies, enterprises,
other organizations, and individuals within and outside China would be
permitted to obtain land use rights and undertake land development.
The maximum period for land use rights ranged from forty years for
commercial, tourism, or recreational users to ﬁfty years for industrial
use and seventy years for residential use. The State Council issued pro-
visional regulations for investment in large tracts of land to attract for-
eign ﬁrms’ investment in tract development. Under these regulations,
tract development referred to the obtaining of land use rights for state
land and the development of infrastructure and other investments.
Changes during 1991
April 9. The National People’s Congress adopted the Law Concerning the
Income Tax of Foreign-Funded Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises
and eliminated a 10 percent tax imposed on distributed proﬁts remitted
abroad by the foreign investors in foreign-funded enterprises. This law
468 Eswar Prasad and Shang-Jin Weiuniﬁed the tax rates for Chinese foreign equity joint ventures and wholly
owned foreign enterprise. It would also provide for more tax beneﬁts in
the priority industrial sectors, with eﬀect from July 1, 1991.
September 26.“Regulations on Borrowing Overseas of Commercial Loans
by Resident Institutions” and “Rules on Foreign Exchange Guarantee
by Resident Institutions in China” were issued.
Changes during 1992
March 1. The policy on foreign trade and investment was further liberal-









September 25. The Regulation on External Guarantees Provided by Do-
mestic Entities was passed, allowing for the provision of guarantees by
authorized ﬁnancial institutions and nonﬁnancial legal entities that had
foreign exchange receipt.
Existing Controls on Capital Transactions as of December 31, 1996
Controls on Capital and Money Market Instruments
On capital market securities
Purchase locally  Nonresidents may only purchase B shares. The 
by nonresidents face value of B shares is denominated in renminbi,
which are listed on the Chinese Securities Ex-
change and can only be bought by foreign in-
vestors.
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by nonresidents
Purchase abroad by  Residents, except ﬁnancial institutions permitted 
residents to engage in foreign borrowing and authorized in-
dustrial and trade enterprises or groups, are not
permitted to purchase securities abroad. A quali-
ﬁcations review by the SAFE is required for ﬁ-
nancial institutions to purchase securities abroad.
Sale or issue abroad  Prior approval by the PBC, the SAFE, or the Se-
by residents curities Supervisory Board is required. Issuing
bonds abroad must be integrated within the state’s
plan for utilizing foreign capital. Bonds can only be
issued by ﬁnancial institutions approved by the PBC.
On money market instruments
Purchase locally by  Nonresidents are not allowed to purchase money 
nonresidents market instruments.
Sale or issue locally  Nonresidents are not allowed to sell or issue 
by nonresidents money market instruments.
Purchase abroad by  Residents, except ﬁnancial institutions permitted 
residents to engage in foreign borrowing, and authorized
industrial and trade enterprises or groups are not
allowed to purchase money market instruments.
Financial institutions must undergo a review of
qualiﬁcations by the SAFE before purchasing for-
eign money market instruments.
Sale or issue abroad  Sale or issue abroad of securities, other than 
by residents stocks, requires PBC and SAFE approval.
On collective investment securities
Purchase locally by  These transactions are not allowed.
nonresidents
Sale or issue locally  There are no regulations, and if these instruments 
by nonresidents are traded they must be approved by the Securities
Policy Commission.
Purchase abroad by  Same regulations as for purchase of money mar-
residents ket instruments apply.
Sale or issue abroad  Same regulations as for sale or issue of money
by residents market instruments apply.
Controls on Derivatives and Other Instruments
Purchase locally by  These transactions are not allowed.
nonresidents
Sale or issue locally  These transactions are not allowed.
by nonresidents
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residents tutions are subject to prior review of qualiﬁca-
tions and to limits on open foreign exchange posi-
tions.
Sale or issue abroad  Same regulations as for purchases apply.
by residents
Controls on Credit Operations
Commercial credits
By residents to  Industrial and commercial enterprises may not 
nonresidents provide lending to nonresidents. Provision of
loans to nonresidents by ﬁnancial institutions is
subject to review of qualiﬁcations by the SAFE
and to a foreign exchange asset-liability ratio re-
quirement.
To residents from  Only ﬁnancial institutions permitted by the SAFE 
nonresidents to engage in external borrowing and authorized
industrial and commercial enterprises or groups
can engage in external borrowing of commercial
credit. For credit over one-year maturity, the loan
must be part of the state plan for utilizing foreign
capital and must be approved by the SAFE.
Short-term commercial credit (with a maturity of
one year or less) is subject to foreign exchange bal-
ance requirements. Financial institutions permit-
ted to engage in foreign borrowing are free to con-
duct short-term foreign borrowing within the
target balance without obtaining approval, but
must register the borrowing with the SAFE.
Short-term foreign ﬁnancing with maturity of
three months or less provided to enterprises—ex-
cluding foreign funded enterprises (FFEs)—is not
subject to limitations, but short-term ﬁnancing of
longer than three months is subject to short-term
foreign exchange balance requirements, and the
borrowing must be registered with the SAFE.
FFEs may borrow from nonresidents without
obtaining approval, but must report the borrow-
ing to SAFE.
Financial credits Same regulations as for commercial credits apply.
Guarantees, sureties, and ﬁnancial backup facilities
By residents to  The regulation on External Guarantees Provided 
nonresidents by Domestic Entities of September 1996 allows
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cial institutions and nonﬁnancial legal entities
that have foreign exchange receipts. Government
agencies or institutions cannot provide guaran-
tees.
Controls on Direct Investment
Outward direct  Foreign exchange is provided for the investment 
investment after a SAFE review of sources of foreign ex-
change assets and an assessment of the investment
risk involved, approval by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC),
and registration with the SAFE.
Inward direct  As long as nonresidents meet requirements under 
investment Sino-foreign joint venture laws and other relevant
regulations, and are approved by MOFTEC, non-
residents are free to invest in China. There is no
restriction on the inward remittance of funds as
far as exchange control is concerned. For environ-
mental and security reasons, inward direct invest-
ment in some industries is prohibited.
Controls on Liquidation of Direct Investment
None.
Controls on Real Estate Transactions
Purchase abroad by  Same regulations as for direct investment apply.
residents
Purchase locally by  Same regulations as for direct investment apply.
nonresidents
Sale locally by  Not available.
nonresidents
Provisions Speciﬁc to Commercial Banks and Other Credit Institutions
Borrowing abroad Same regulations as for commercial credits apply.
Maintenance of  Prior approval by the SAFE is required for do-
accounts abroad mestic entities opening foreign exchange accounts
abroad.
Lending to nonresi- Lending is allowed subject to review of qualiﬁca-
dents (ﬁnancial or  tions by the SAFE and to asset-liability ratio re
commercial credits quirements.
Lending locally in  Lending is mainly subject to qualiﬁcations review 
foreign exchange by the SAFE and to asset-liability ratio require-
ments.
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issued securities  foreign currency.
denominated in 
foreign exchange
Diﬀerential Treatment of Nonresident Deposit Accounts 
and/or Deposit Accounts in Foreign Exchange
Reserve requirements There are diﬀerent reserve requirements for de-
posits in renminbi and in foreign currency, and
also between the latter in domestic banks and in
FFEs (i.e., 13 percent for deposits in renminbi, 5
percent for any foreign currency deposit in do-
mestic banks, and 3 percent for deposits in foreign
currency for over three months and 5 percent for
less than three months, in FFEs).
Liquid asset  Bank foreign exchange liquid assets (one year or 
requirements less) should not be less than 60 percent of liquid li-
abilities (one year or less) and 30 percent of total
foreign exchange assets. Total deposits with three-
month maturities, deposits in both domestic and
foreign banks, funds used for purchasing transfer-
able foreign currency–denominated securities, de-
posits with the central bank, and cash holdings
should not be less than 15 percent of total foreign
exchange assets. Nonbank foreign exchange liq-
uid assets (one year or less) should not be less than
60 percent of liquid liabilities (one year or less)
and 25 percent of total assets. Total deposits with
three-month maturities, deposits in both domes-
tic and foreign banks, funds used for purchasing
transferable foreign currency–denominated secu-
rities, deposits with the central bank, and cash
holdings should not be less than 10 percent of to-
tal assets.
Credit controls Total loans, investment guarantees (calculated as
50 percent of the balance guaranteed), and other
foreign exchange credits provided to a legal entity
by banks or nonbank ﬁnancial institutions should
not exceed 30 percent of the foreign exchange cap-
ital owned by the banks or nonbank ﬁnancial in-
stitutions.
Investment  Bank equity investment should not exceed the 
regulations diﬀerence between bank capital and mandatory
paid-in capital. Nonbank ﬁnancial institutions’
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should not exceed the diﬀerence between their
capital and mandatory paid-in capital.
Open  foreign  For ﬁnancial institutions trading foreign ex-
exchange  position  change on their own behalf, the daily total 
limits amount traded (total open foreign exchange posi-
tion) should not exceed 20 percent of the foreign
exchange working capital. As authorized by the
highest level of management, ﬁnancial institu-
tions trading foreign exchange on their own be-
half may retain a small amount of overnight open
position, but this should not exceed 1 percent of
the foreign exchange working capital.





Controls on capital  January 1. Regulations for issuing bonds denomi-
and money market  nated in foreign currency by domestic institutions 
instruments were issued.
Controls on credit  January 1. The implementation bylaws of regula-
operations tions for external guarantees by domestic institu-
tions were issued. Forward letters of credit (LCs)
with a maturity exceeding 90 days and less than
365 days were included in the category of short-
term credit, while those exceeding one year were
included in the category of medium- and long-
term international commercial loans. External
borrowing regulations were changed.
August 20. Enterprises were barred from advance
prepayment of debt.
Changes during 1999
Controls on credit  July 15.Some controls on renminbi loans to FFEs 
operations under foreign exchange liens or guarantees were
eased.
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None.
Changes during 2001
Controls on capital  February 22. Domestic investors were allowed to 
and money market  purchase B shares with existing foreign currency 
instruments deposits.
June 1. Domestic investors were allowed to pur-
chase B shares with new foreign currency de-
posits.
Controls on credit  September 19. Restrictions were liberalized on 
operations purchases of foreign exchange for advance repay-
ments of domestic and foreign currency loans,
loans converted from foreign debt, and foreign
debts, as follows: if the loan contract contains an
advance repayment clause, the party may use its
own foreign exchange to make advance repay-
ment, subject to SAFE approval; and, subject to
SAFE approval, a party may purchase foreign ex-
change to make advance repayments of loans, in-
cluding (a) loans made with approval of the State
Council; (b) loans for enterprise debt restructur-
ing, for permanent or temporary closure, or for
merger or transfer of ownership due to a change in
national policy; and (c) loans where advance re-
payments are deemed necessary by a court.
Controls on direct  September 19. The purchase of foreign exchange 
investment was authorized for investments abroad in strategic
foreign projects that have been approved by the State
Council, projects that entail importing of materials
into China for processing, and foreign aid projects.
Changes during 2002
Controls on capital  September 1. Prior approval by the China Securi-
and  money  market  ties Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was re-
instruments quired for overseas listed domestic companies
(OLDCs) and China-held foreign listed compa-
nies (CHFLCs) to sell shares overseas. The for-
eign exchange proceeds must not be retained over-
seas without SAFE approval and must be
The Chinese Approach to Capital Inﬂows 475repatriated within thirty days and kept in OLDCs’
foreign exchange accounts or converted into ren-
minbi (with SAFE approval).
December 1. Qualiﬁed foreign institutional in-
vestors (QFIIs) were allowed to invest domesti-
cally in A shares, subject to restrictions.
Controls on direct  April 1. A new four-tier classiﬁcation was intro-
investment duced, deﬁning activities in which foreign invest-
ment is encouraged, permitted, restricted, or
banned. As a result, many industries that were
previously closed to foreign investment, particu-
larly in the services sector, were opened.
Changes during 2003
Provisions speciﬁc to  January 1.Registration with and permission from 
commercial banks  the SAFE to repay the principal were no longer 
and other credit  required for residents to borrow foreign exchange 
institutions from domestic Chinese ﬁnancial institutions.
Controls on direct  November 1. In some provinces and regions, the 
investment limit on outward investment was increased to the
equivalent of US$3 million from US$1 million.
Provisions speciﬁc to  January 1. Registration with and permission from 
commercial banks  the SAFE to repay the principal were no longer 
and other credit  required for residents to borrow foreign exchange 
institutions from domestic Chinese ﬁnancial institutions.
November 19. A memorandum of understanding
between the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and
the China Banking Regulatory Commission to
share supervisory information on banks operat-
ing in mainland China and Hong Kong and to en-
sure that parent banks maintain eﬀective control
over their cross-border branches and subsidiaries
came into eﬀect.
Changes during 2004
Controls on capital  QFIIs may invest domestically in A shares, sub-
market securities  ject to the following restrictions: (a) a QFII must 
purchased  locally  have minimum experience in the industry (ﬁve 
by nonresidents years for fund managers, thirty years for insur-
ance companies) and the equivalent of at least
US$10 billion in assets under management in the
latest ﬁnancial year and must be clear of any ma-
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three years; (b) a QFII that is a bank must have as-
sets that rank it among the top 100 internationally
in the latest ﬁnancial year; (c) a QFII that is an in-
surance or a securities company must have mini-
mum paid-up capital of the equivalent of US$1
billion; and (d) ownership of any Chinese com-
pany listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock ex-
change by a QFII may not exceed 10 percent, and
the total shares owned by QFIIs in a single Chi-
nese company may not exceed 20 percent. QFIIs
must set up special renminbi accounts with do-
mestic banks and use the services of domestic se-
curities companies. Closed-end QFIIs may only
remit capital after three years, in installments of
no more than 20 percent of the total each time, at
intervals of one month or more. Other QFIIs may
only remit capital after one year, in installments of
no more than 20 percent of the total, and at inter-
vals of three months or longer.
Provisions speciﬁc to  January 1. Under the Closer Economic Partner-
commercial banks  ship Arrangement, (a) the asset requirement for 
and  other  credit  Hong Kong–incorporated banks to open 
institutions branches in mainland China was reduced to US$6
billion from US$20 billion; (b) the requirement
for setting up a representative oﬃce in mainland
China before a Hong Kong bank establishes a
joint-venture bank or joint-venture ﬁnance com-
pany in mainland China was lifted; and (c) for
mainland China branches of Hong Kong banks to
apply to conduct renminbi business, the minimum
number of years of business operations on the
mainland required of the banks was reduced to
two years from three years.
The oﬃcial ceiling on foreign bank ownership
of a Chinese bank was raised to 25 percent (from
20 percent), and the ceiling for any one bank was
increased to 20 percent (from 15 percent).
June 27. Domestic foreign-funded banks were not
permitted to convert debt contracted abroad into
renminbi and were not allowed to purchase foreign
exchange for servicing such debts. Capital ob-
tained through FDI could only be converted into
renminbi upon proof of a domestic payment order.
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investment be converted to renminbi upon proof of domestic
payment order.
Controls on personal  December 1. Foreign heirs, including those from 
capital movements Hong Kong and Macau, were permitted to take
inheritances oﬀ of the mainland. Emigrants were
allowed to take legally obtained personal assets
with them; amounts up to US$200,000 could be
moved without restriction, while amounts in ex-
cess of US$200,000 could be transferred in stages
over a minimum of two years.
Changes during January 2005
Provisions speciﬁc to  January 15. The reserve requirements on deposits 
commercial banks  in renminbi and foreign currencies were uniﬁed at 
and other credit  3 percent.
institutions
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